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But, as Goethe put it: "nur ein Teil der Kunst kann gelehrt werden, der Kunstler macht das Ganze" "only a part of the art can be taught, the artist makes the totality". The author, Henk Klasen, is a remarkable man. As a general surgeon, he devotes all his interest and skills to traumatology and problems of phys- iology and pathophysiology in surgery.

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With such talents it is natural that he also works parttime as one of the coordinators ofa modern burn unit. Among his hobbies are love of antiques and old books. This historical inclination has induced him to write the present book, in which he vividly describes the development of free skin grafting in its rel- evant theoretical and practical aspects. His elaborate study has resulted in an excellent reference book which at the same time provides enjoyable reading, once again demonstrating the value of history in understanding the present.

Read more Read less. K; Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. No customer reviews. Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review. Discover the best of shopping and entertainment with Amazon Prime. For it would be possible to hold the pragmatistic theory of meaning and truth, without basing it on any fundamen tal theory of relations, and without extending such a theory of relations to residual philo sophical problems; without, in short, holding either to the above statement of fact, or to the following generalized conclusion.

The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans- empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous struc ture. It excludes "the hypothesis of trans-empirical reality " Cf.

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It is that positive and constructive empiricism of which Professor James said : "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hith erto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin. The editor desires to acknowledge his obli gations to the periodicals from which these essays have been reprinted, and to the many friends of Professor James who have rendered valuable advice and assistance in the prepara tion of the present volume.

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January 8, Philosophy, re flecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her explanations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future. At first, spirit and matter, soul and body, stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant un dermined the soul and brought in the tran scendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance.

The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. I, No. For the relation be tween this essay and those which follow, cf. It loses personal form and act ivity these passing over to the content and becomes a bare Bewusstheit or Bewusstsein uberhaupt, of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing soul upon the air of philosophy.

During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of aban doning the notion of consciousness, 1 and sub stituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors. Perry is frankly over the border. For twenty years past I have mistrusted consciousness as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in reali ties of experience.

Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, 1 contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts per form, and for the performance of which this 1 [Similarly, there is no "activity of consciousness as such.

That function is "I knowing. Consciousness is supposed neces sary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function s being carried on.

The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its terms becomes the subject or bearer of the know ledge, the knower, 1 the other becomes the ob ject known. This will need much explanation before it can be understood. The best way to 1 In my Psychology I have tried to show that we need no knower other than the passing thought.

If neo-Kantism has expelled earlier forms of dualism, we shall have expelled all forms if we are able to expel neo-Kantism in its turn. For the thinkers I call neo-Kantian, the word consciousness to-day does no more than signal ize the fact that experience is indef easibly dual- istic in structure.

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It means that not subject, not object, but object-plus-subject is the mini mum that can actually be. The subject-object distinction meanwhile is entirely different from that between mind and matter, from that be tween body and soul. Souls were detachable, had separate destinies; things could happen to them. To consciousness as such nothing can happen, for, timeless itself, it is only a witness of happenings in time, in which it plays no part.

Consciousness as such is entirely impersonal self and its activities belong to the content. To say that I am self-conscious, or conscious of putting forth volition, means only that certain contents, for which self and effort of will are the names, are not without witness as they occur. Thus, for these belated drinkers at the Kant ian spring, we should have to admit conscious ness as an epistemological necessity, even if we had no direct evidence of its being there. But in addition to this, we are supposed by almost every one to have an immediate con sciousness of consciousness itself.

When the world of outer fact ceases to be materially pre sent, and we merely recall it in memory, or fancy it, the consciousness is believed to stand out and to be felt as a kind of impalpable inner flowing, which, once known in this sort of expe rience, may equally be detected in presenta tions of the outer world. It seems as if we had be fore us a mere emptiness. When we try to in trospect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were dia phanous.

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Yet it can be distinguished, if we look attentively enough, and know that there is something to look for. While in this way consciousness, or reference to a self, is the only thing which distinguishes a con scious content from any sort of being that might be there with no one conscious of it, yet this only ground of the distinction defies all closer explanations.

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The existence of conscious ness, although it is the fundamental fact of psychology, can indeed be laid down as cer tain, can, be brought out by analysis, but can i G. Moore: Mind, vol. This supposes that the conscious ness is one element, moment, factor call it what you like of an experience of essentially dualistic inner constitution, from which, if you abstract the content, the consciousness will re main revealed to its own eye. Experience, at this rate, would be much like a paint of which the world pictures were made.

Paint has a dual constitution, involving, as it does, a men struum 2 oil, size or what not and a mass of content in the form of pigment suspended therein. We can get the pure menstruum by letting the pigment settle, and the pure pig ment by pouring off the size or oil. We operate here by physical subtraction; and the usual view is, that by mental subtraction we can separate the two factors of experience in an 1 Paul Natorp: Einleitung in die Psychologic, , pp.

Ladd: Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, , p. II Now my contention is exactly the reverse of this. Experience, I believe, has no such inner du plicity; and the separation of it into conscious ness and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of expe riences, in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds.

The paint will also serve here as an illustration.

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In a pot in a paint-shop, along with other paints, it serves in its entirety as so much sale able matter. Spread on a canvas, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing. It is an af fair of relations, it falls outside, not inside, the single experience considered, and can always i be particularized and defined. If the reader will take his own experiences, he will see what I mean. Let him begin with a perceptual experience, the presentation, so called, of a physical object, his actual field of vision, the room he sits in, with the book he is reading as its centre; and let him for the pre sent treat this complex object in the common- sense way as being really what it seems to be, namely, a collection of physical things cut out from an environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations.

Now at the same time it is just those self -same things which his mind, as we say, perceives; and the whole phi losophy of perception from Democritus s time downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person s mind.

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Well, the experience is a member of diverse processes that can be followed away from it along entirely different lines. What are the two processes, now, into which the room-experience simultaneously enters in this way? One of them is the reader s personal bio graphy, the other is the history of the house of which the room is part.